The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies

By:

Higashijima, Masaaki [auth]

Material type: Article

ArticleLanguage: English Series: Weiser Center for Emerging DemocraciesPublication details: University of Michigan Press 2022Description: 1 electronic resource (366 p.)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9780472075317
9780472055319
9780472220083

Subject(s):

Online resources:

Summary: Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition’s stunning election victories. The book’s theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Collection	Shelving location	Call number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Electronic edition	Bucheon University Library	History / Biographies of prominent people	OAPEN	94 W47	Not for loan	Смотреть (pdf)		1009639

Open Access star Unrestricted online access

Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition’s stunning election victories. The book’s theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.